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However, litigation by the EP still remains a rare act in this newer context, largely conducted individually and less so collectively. This thus remains an understudied story in scholarship.
Galanter's leading work on litigation and its actors through the deployment of a law and society perspective, is used here rather loosely and distantly, as a backdrop for this work to examine the practices of the EP as a litigator within the particular context of transatlantic security because of its factual and theoretical appeal. According to Galanter, examining US litigation practices over an extended time-period, repeat-players (RP) were generally institutions, wealthy ones, with advance intelligence and the ability to employ the system so as to become an 'insider'. More fundamentally, RP had an ability to both manipulate and develop rules. One-shooters (OS), by contrast, tended to be individuals with few resources and tended to litigate for immediate outcomes.
3 Galanter's theorization arguably provides both a useful and possibly insightful lens through which to understand the nature and effects of the judicial process, even outside of the US context and its particular actors. It is argued to provide a model of some value for those considering litigation by actors in a changing institutional landscape, as both the subjects and objects of that litigation.
One feature of contemporary transatlantic relations is the place of individual versus collective litigation initiated in the public interest. In this regard, public interest is a means to assess the impact and relevance of the litigation of the EP. Individual parliamentarians in the EU and one in particular, Sophie in't veld, the chair of the EP Civil Liberties Committee, has been litigating civil liberties issues in transatlantic security agreements with much frequency in the public interest, but not supported by the EP en masse in litigation. 4 A retrospective analysis of EU-US PNR litigation involves appreciating these developments as much as the legal and political context prevailing at the time of the litigation. This retrospective focusses upon the EP as a litigator here and the evolving nature of the EP's foreign affairs powers. Nonetheless, this account also reflects to some degree at least how 3 Galanter also distinguished between the 'special' and 'general' effects of litigation. In this regard, he sought to distinguish between the effects produced by the impact of litigation, e.g. this litigation would be assessed were it to arise in the present circumstances in all of its political and legal complexity, as much as its more recent counterparts, involving largely the actions of one parliamentarian alone.
This account develops and re-envisages this story as a retrospective and takes as a starting point in Section I the powers of the EP and its (non-)litigious nature as an institutional actor and examines what can be achieved through litigation in EU law. In Section II, the account reexamines what the Court decided in EU-US PNR and its effects, followed in Section III by the account of the proceedings that the author has uncovered through interviewing participants in the litigation, predominantly related to or from the perspective of the EP. Section IV reflects upon retelling the story and how it might be decided were it to arise today.
SECTION I: THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP TO THE EU-US PNR LITIGATION (A) The European Parliament and Foreign Affairs: law and practice
The history of the powers and competences of the EP pursuant to EU law is an evolution of modest empowerment steps, expanded gradually, and only sometimes through judicial review. Moreover, historically, the EP has used its legislative 'consent' powers as delay powers and such powers have evolved through the treaties into more substantive legal powers. Briefly, it is worth recalling the types of judicial review mechanism open to the EP as a litigator in EU law in the area of foreign affairs, both prior to and after the Treaty of Lisbon changes.
(C) Ex Ante v. Ex Post Judicial Review and EU Foreign Affairs
The EU-US PNR decision remains a highly prominent example of ex post facto judicial review, where ex ante review did not materialize and it is perhaps useful to consider the difference between the two forms of procedure, prior to assessing the actual case itself. Any EU institution or Member State is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a draft international agreement prior to its conclusion Looking more broadly as its use since the 1970s, its use often coincides with major Treaty changes.
However, the practical results between either procedure may not necessarily be so vast, yet warrant analysis further below, after the details of the EU-US PNR decision are considered. There, political turmoil resulted from the EP's request for ex ante review being rendered moot by an agreement reached.
Thus substantively, the paper next turns to consider the legal backdrop to the PNR litigation, by providing a concise overview of legal mechanisms through which the case arose and its findings.
SECTION II: THE EU-US PNR DECISION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE
Controversy and high politics undoubtedly taints EU-US PNR in its law and politics and the decision arguably stands as a reminder of the uncomfortable-and often intractable-nexus between the two.
It remains of political and legal relevance that the EU-US PNR has its origins in US legislation passed in the wake of the 9/11 atrocities, requiring airline carriers to provide US authorities with passenger data under threat of sanction. 'It is true that the processing constituted by the collection and recording of air passenger data by airlines has, in general, a commercial purpose in so far as it is connected with the operation of the flight by the air carrier. …namely the sale of an aeroplane ticket which provides entitlement to a supply of services. However, the data processing which is taken into account in the decision on adequacy is quite different in nature, since it covers a stage subsequent to the initial collection of the data. ….
… In actual fact, the decision on adequacy does not concern a data processing operation necessary for a supply of services, but one regarded as necessary to safeguard public security and for law-enforcement purposes. The relevance of the place of individuals and officials in the EU-US PNR decision is paramount in a retrospective storytale and it is this context to which the account next turns. Accordingly, the context and actual proceedings of the litigation are accounted for, through the insiders perspective. 
III. LOOKING BEYOND THE LAW: KEY FIGURES IN, AROUND AND OF THE EU-US PNR LITIGATION
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Another official, who did not wish to be identified, described the EU-US PNR litigation as formally viewed a victory (but also a 'pyrrhic' one), which was in fact politically useful and in fact even a big legal victory for its Parliament and its Legal Service. They described the views of the Court of Justice and Advocate General as disappointing, with split views which provided evidence of much debate in the Court. Nonetheless, it was politically useful as a decision because the European Parliament and its Legal Service became involved in subsequent agreements and the case became a mere first step towards other more significant changes. They suggested that there was a tendency to overlook agreements with Argentina and Japan and their similarities with the US Agreement as a model. They also suggested that the EP would increasingly litigate well beyond its 10 cases a year in future times, now as joint legislator, but also as individual politicians, representing an increasing number of Member States. They said that it was a complicated procedure to get a mandate for litigation in the first place-never mind to intervene in litigation and it had a policy of not intervening in support of the litigation of individual members.
Another former official, who did not wish to be named, recalled how the hearing of EU-US PNR decision was expected to take two days before the Court of Justice, with two cases, one against Council, other against Commission. The official described the hearing as 'terrible', whereby the pleadings were 'hurried up' and rolled into one morning by the President much to the dismay and surprise of many EU institutions, even refusing the second agent of the EP the possibility to speak.
The official described how the Courtroom of the ECJ was coincidentally full of national superior court judges on a visit to the Court of Justice, somewhat skewing the dynamic of the hearing-and possibly also explaining the rush by the Court to stop the hearing at lunchtime. They stated that the EP did not accept that the PNR decision was a disaster. Their request for an Opinion had become moot and the EP legal service appeared to go further than their political representatives in 'sticking' to a validity hearing. The EP Legal Service appeared also to take the events as an 'insult'. The official expressed dismay at their delight with victory of the Court, as a historic finding of invalidity. Their request for an Opinion had not halted the negotiations, as it had had no suspensory effect. The threat of the US fining airlines had entailed that the negotiations on an Agreement had proceeded with expedition. In response to a question as to the nature of the interactions between the institutions, the official responses that in retrospect there should have been more interactions between the legal services. Moreover, the original negotiator of the 1st agreement from DG Market was eventually fired. As to the impact of the judgment, on the day of the judgment a teleconference had been scheduled at 5pm with the US as to how to follow up and reopen negotiations so as to respect the judgment-which was called off on account of the 'validity' judgment, with the effect that there no longer was an agreement to be discussed. Another former official, who did not wish to be named, maintained that the decision harbored particularly bad memories for them, which they labelled as one of the 'stupidest' ever taken by the EP and ever accepted by the Court. the conduct of the US as worse than that experienced during Soviet Times. 42 In response to a question concerning how high-profile she perceived that her actions at European level might be seen in domestic (Dutch) politics, she described it as having had little impact at national level, despite being interviewed and cited extensively in international media, for example, the International Herald
Tribune. As to the perspective of the Commission on the mounting disquiet in the European Parliament, she described her interactions with the Dutch Commissioner, who she described as a 'sympathetic' member of the Commission (Fritz Bolkenstein), whose viewpoint was that inevitably defeat would result from European opposition to US action, although the latter assertion of sympathy was contradicted by another official interviewed, but not an official of her nationality.
Turning finally to a current member of the EP since 2004, and the last two parliaments, Sophie In't veld was interviewed by the author extensively as a highly relevant actor in contemporary She described how there was much resistance of Legal Service of the EP to intervention and also described the EP as very 'empty handed' in transatlantic security, even after mass-surveillance inquiry.
The account next turns to her litigation in greater detail.
(B) What Sophie Did Next: The Litigation of In't Veld MEP
What followed after the PNR litigation was further individual litigation, conducted without intervention by the European Parliament en masse-i.e. many small-scale efforts to procure freedom of information or procure PNR data through administrative rather than wholly judicial procedures, as is provided for in the PNR regime. This litigation has been conducted by in't Veld MEP. Her story is considered here briefly in order to place the EU-US PNR litigation in perspective. Her account is argued here to be of relevance to the analysis of the public interest in transatlantic security and the 'separation' of one-shotters and repeat-hitters.
In' t veld's story begins with her efforts, albeit unsuccessful, to obtain her own Passenger Name
Record data under the US Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation through litigation which was dismissed for 'erroneously' maintaining that the airlines carriers data and the Department of Homeland Security data were equivalent or similar. 46 Yet In't veld has played and continues to play a significant role in litigating aspects of other major EU-US security agreements. The SWIFT Agreement Her litigation must surely be regarded as most notable and institutionally unsupported at least officially by the wider body politic of the European Parliament. In this regard, her story or her part of it must be seen in a broader context, where Passenger Name Records is still under development within in the EU legislative process, a context which is considered here next.
SECTION IV: RETELLING THE STORY: HOW MIGHT EU-US PNR BE DECIDED TODAY?
The success and effectiveness of transatlantic rule-making, specifically the EU-US Passenger Name
Records (EU-US PNR) Agreements and EU-US Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme (EU-US TFTP)
Agreements respectively has spurred the EU to engage in 'replica' rule-making inspired by the EU-US PNR and EU-US TFTP. 52 The recent outbreak of the NSA surveillance saga has operated to place EU citizens fundamental rights and data protection centrally in all rule-making of the EU with the US. It also caused the EP to vociferously call into question a range of existing EU-US security agreements, i.e. external EU security. 53 The NSA surveillance has also re-ignited EU-US negotiations on a data protection framework. 54 While the EP has voted to suspect all EU-US data transfer agreements on foot of its inquiry on mass surveillance by the US, by contrast, the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs
Ministerial meeting in late 2013 stressed the importance of developing the EU-US negotiations on a data protection agreement, referencing the work of the EU-US ad hoc working group on the NSA surveillance saga. 55 It raises the question as to the role of the EP in either setting or (merely) defending the public interest in EU foreign affairs and its effectiveness-and the acceptance by the Court of the need for institutional balance in foreign affairs. At this point in time, a complete or final analysis remains impossible. Yet one official interviewed described how the recent Advocate General
Opinion on the Data Retention Directive was extremely strong, arguably unduly opposed to bulk retention. They adverted to the question of how the PNR case might be litigated today as one that was increasingly interesting to judge. 56 Another interviewee emphasized how the Data Retention Direction expressly excluded police activity on account of the PNR decision. As a result, they said that its impact could in no way be seen as an EU-US 'PNR II'.
But what would litigation of PNR by the EP do in the current context? What benefit could it generate? Would the EP be able to procure a victory with substance to it? First and foremost, the EP does not per se enjoy any special powers to litigate the 'governance' provisions or functioning of EU-US Agreements in security. The likelihood of litigation is small. The governance of such agreements has generated many challenges as to the rule of law. 57 But their justiciability remains problematic.
The EP enjoys no special oversight role in the latest PNR agreement and has been attempting to procure transparency and information as a collective body but without litigating it. Nonetheless, ex ante review of the 2011 PNR agreement was sought by the EP, which again fell into mootness.
Second, the political gains of such litigation could be minimal, just as EU-US PNR indicates. The development of institutional balance in foreign affairs may be an embryonic one, involving many competence questions to be evolved ex ante and ex post facto questions as to the negotiations of international agreements. Thirdly, the PNR decision now acts as an increasingly awkward precedents for the Court in the era of the NSA surveillance saga and a multiplicity of fundamental rights instruments (for example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights). The recent Data Retention decision demonstrates that the Court is not afraid to put EU fundamental rights centrally in this context.
Fourth and finally, the high profile nature of in't Veld's work, even if often done initially through conducting 'low level' action (e.g. FOI procedures) and then transparency laws, raises the issue as to the shifting public interest in transatlantic relations, to be developed by one-shotters in repeathitters clothes, rather than repeat-hitters themselves.
In this regard, this retrospective has engaged only to some extent in the 'bigger picture' of transatlantic relations, looking beyond small-scale story of the institutional context the actions of the EP as litigator. It must be recalled that the US Attorney General has claimed before the European Parliament that no human rights violations have ever resulted from transatlantic justice and home affairs cooperation. 58 By contrast, certain Members of the European Parliament, most audibly In't
Veld, have claimed that the secrecy surrounding the transmission of data under certain transatlantic Agreements makes it virtually impossible to assess their operation, even if couched in an extensive network of governance mechanisms. 59 These issues are of much significance in considering their potential litigation. While it is a gloomy way to conclude, there are reasons to suggest that their complexity may never be properly the subject of ex post facto judicial review and that the EU-US PNR decision is neither replicable nor likely.
Conclusions
The formulation of one-shot hitters and repeat-players as to EU-US PNR has some obvious resonance to it here as an underexplored story on the evolution of an institutional player in EU law.
It serves to show how one-shotters and repeat-players may not always be so readily separable or may alter depending on the law and politics of the situation. Transatlantic relations agreements in security has brought into question the role of individual versus collective litigation and the structures of the EP to sustain a particular type of pattern of litigation in the public interest. It arguably underscores the complexity of formulating the public interest in EU law as its Area of Freedom, leading case depicted in this volume, not least Les Verts. EU-US PNR generated a process of litigation that would see many changes in EU-US security. In this regard, it offers an important story worth retelling for understanding responses to the NSA affair and the future of EU-US relations in security.
